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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

E. O'DELL STANLEY

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890185-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of operating a pyramid
scheme, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) and practicing medicine without a license, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-12-30
(Cumm. Supp. 1989) in the Fourth Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant was denied the effective

assistance of counsel?
2.

Whether the trial court had proper subject matter

jurisdiction to try defendant under Utah Code Ann. SS 58-1228(4)(a) (1986) and S 58-12-30 (Cumm. Supp. 1989)?
3.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain

defendant's convictions for operating a pyramid scheme and
practicing medicine without a license?
4.

Whether defendant's constitutional challenge to

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) was properly preserved for

appellate review, and if so, whether Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-3
(Supp. 1989) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes and rules for a determination
of this case are, in pertinent part:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986)«
"Practice of medicine" means:
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, advise,
or prescribe for any human disease, ailment,
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other
condition, physical or mental, real or
imaginary, or to attempt to do so by any
means or instrumentality.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Cuxmn. Supp. 1989):
It is unlawful to engage in the practice
of medicine in this state without first
obtaining a license. Any person who
engages in the practice of medicine
without a license shall be guilty of a
felony; except the following persons may
engage in activities included in the
practice of medicine subject to the
circumstances and limitations stated:
•

• • •

(5) any individual administering a
domestic or family remedy including those
persons engaged in the sale of vitamins,
health food or health food supplements,
herb or other products of nature, except
drugs or medicines for which an authorized
prescription is required by law.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-2(4) (Supp. 1989)i
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or
plan under which a person gives consideration
to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive compensation
which is derived primarily from the
introduction of other persons into the sales
device or plan rather than from the sale of
goods, services, or other property.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989)s
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(1) A person may not organize, establish,
promote, or administer any pyramid scheme.
(2) A criminal conviction under this
chapter is prima facie evidence of a
violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act.
(3) Any violation of this chapter
constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4,
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
(4) All civil violations of this chapter
shall be investigated and prosecuted as
prescribed by the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-7(a) (Supp. 1989):
A person acting under color of law may
intercept a wire, electronic, or oral
communication if that person is a party to
the communication or one of the parties to
the communication has given prior consent to
the interception.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, E. O'Dell Stanley, was charged by amended
information with operating a pyramid scheme, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) and
practicing medicine without a license, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. SS 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986) and 58-12-30
(Cumm. Supp. 1989) (R. 52-53).

Defendant was convicted after a

jury trial held on September 6, 1988 (R. 113-14).

On November

18, 1988, Judge Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial District, sentenced
defendant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not
to exceed five years on each count concurrently (R. 130).

The

execution of both sentences was suspended and defendant placed on
probation for eighteen months under specified terms and
conditions (R. 129-30).
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Defendant filed premature and successive notices of
appeal (R. 120, 136, 145)- These appeals were subsequently
dismissed (Case No. 880586-CA, R. 123-24, dismissed R. 137; Case
No. 880673-CA, R. 138-40, dismissed R. 152). However, the
appeals, dismissals and remittiturs caused the trial court to reimpose defendant's sentence on March 10, 1989 (R. 158-60).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, who had no medical training nor medical
expertise (T. 316), organized and obtained a Utah business
license to operate the Healthy Wealthy and Wise Club [hereinafter
referred to as HWW] (R. 232, 300-01).
corporation (T. 256-57).

HWW filed as a non-profit

Its product, Super Oxol, was registered

as "cleaning fluids or to help clean the environment" and
alternatively as "cleaning fluids" (R. 230-301).

The

registration did not indicate the product was intended for
medical use nor internal consumption (R. 301).
Super Oxol was produced by defendant by mixing
distilled water with hydrogen peroxide (R. 230-31).

Defendant

purchased cases of distilled water from Smith's Food King.

He

would empty approximately 12 ounces of the distilled water from
its gallon container and replace the water with 12 ounces of
hydrogen peroxide, 38% solution, from in a 55 gallon drum.

The

one gallon distilled water container was then sealed with a new
lid and a Super Oxol label was placed over the distilled water
label (R. 230-31).

The resulting Super Oxol solution contained

anywhere from a three to eleven percent solution of hydrogen
peroxide (R. 214-15).
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Dr. Joseph Miner, M.D., director of City County Health
Department, Utah County, testified that when purchased from a
store, hydrogen peroxide is generally in a solution from three to
six percent (R. 209). Solutions over eight percent are
considered corrosive (R. 209, 213). The only medical uses for
hydrogen peroxide are as a topical antiseptic and an aid for
cleaning off dead tissues in a wound (R. 209-10).

If taken

internally in concentrated solutions above three to six percent,
hydrogen peroxide will cause severe irritation, esophagitis
inflammation, and gastrointestinal bleeding (R. 210, 213).

Even

at lower level solutions, repeated ingestion of hydrogen peroxide
can cause similar types of internal irritation (R. 213).
Despite claims that HWW was created as a non-profit
organization to promote healthy lifestyles based on the
consumption of Super Oxol, HWW was structured such that its
income was generated from the sale of its memberships rather than
its product (R. 232-33).

For twenty-five dollars ($25.00) a

month, an HWW member would receive one gallon of Super Oxol (R.
234).

Any additional purchases of the product could be made at

wholesale.
retail.

The members were free to resell the gallons at

Any profit would be retained by the member but no

commission for sales could be earned (R. 233-34, 304-06).
However, the primary financial incentive to membership was the
commission or bonuses paid to members for every new member
recruited (R. 232-33).

For each new member recruited, a member

would receive a commission of six dollars and twenty-five cents
($6.25) (R. 233). The member would also earn a percentage from
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each subsequent member recruited by the new member (R. 233).
Thus, if a member at the first level had ten members immediately
under him and the second level members each had ten members under
them, the first level member would purportedly earn six thousand
two hundred fifty dollars ($6,230*00) a month in commissions from
HWW (R. 242). On the other hand, if a member recruited no new
members but sold two hundred gallons of Super Oxol a month, the
member would receive no commission from HWW (R. 306-07).
Information concerning the commissions or bonuses for
recruiting new members and potential earning at various levels
were contained in all HWW membership applications (R. 227).
Members promised to share the sales plan with friends and
neighbors (R. 235). Defendant actively promoted the use of Super
Oxol and HWW membership throughout the county including at senior
citizen centers (R. 282, 294).
Richard Castro, chief investigator for the Utah County
Attorney's Office, listened to defendant's sales pitch in one of
these meetings.

Mr. Castro testified defendant represented that

as much as one hundred twenty eight thousand, seven hundered
seventy dollars ($128,770.00) could be earned each month (T. 77).
This income was based strictly on the introduction of new members
to HWW and not on the sales of any product (T. 68).
On March 9, 1988, Rosa Krolls, the mother of a
secretary in the Utah County Attorney's Office (T. 44), at her
daughter's request, telephoned defendant to purchase some Super
Oxol.

The delivery was set for the next day at Mrs. Krolls' home

(T. 45). With Mrs. Krolls' permission, her living room was wired
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for sound (T. 49). A transcript was subsequently prepared of the
meeting between Mrs. Krolls and defendant (T. 50).
On March 10, 1988, defendant met with Mrs. Krolls at
her home (R. 218). Mrs. Krolls told defendant she had high blood
pressure.

Defendant responded that if she drank Super Oxol ". .

. it would make [her] a lot healthier and would help [her]" (R.
221-22).

He further explained that Super Oxol would expand and

clean her blood vessels, giving them more elasticity and making
it easier for her blood to flow thereby reducing her blood
pressure (R. 220, 224). Defendant claimed he also warned Mrs.
Krolls to watch her blood pressure very carefully because it
might go too low if she was taking blood pressure pills as well
(R. 297). Mrs. Krolls purchased a gallon of Super Oxol for
$12.50 (R. 219, 221).
During their meeting, defendant told Mrs. Krolls about
HWW, left her a membership application explaining the multi-level
sales scheme and offered to take her to a meeting (R. 219-20,
228-29).

Defendant told Mrs. Krolls that if she became a member

of HWW and sponsored four new members and they in turn each
sponsored down to the fifth level, she would receive four
thousand two hundred eighty five dollars ($4,285.00) in
commissions each month.

If she sponsored five new members she

could earn over twelve thousand dollars ($12,000.00) in
commissions a month (R. 294-95).
Defendant testified on his own behalf (R. 269-317).

He

did not dispute any of the State's evidence as to the origination
of HWW and Super Oxol (R. 271-72), the method of operation of HWW
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(R. 285-87) nor the meeting and representations made to Mrs.
Krolls (R. 271).
Instead, defendant took issue with Dr. Miner's
statements that the internal ingestion of hydrogen peroxide
cannot expand nor cleanse blood vessels nor provide any other
medical purpose or benefit (R. 211-12).

Defendant claimed, based

on his review of medical literature, that the daily ingestion of
hydrogen peroxide in forms such as Super Oxol could produce more
energy and stamina (R. 282-83) and help "most anything" (R. 273),
including aids coronary disease, cancer, diptheria and whooping
cough (R. 283-84, 316-17).

Defendant asserted that the American

Medical Association was against the consumption of hydrogen
peroxide because its use would "reduce disease by 98 percent" and
limit the need for doctors (R. 300).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The defendant has failed to establish that his trial
counsel committed any demonstrable errors which reasonably
affected the outcome of his case.

The Utah Interception of

Communications Act permits the recording of a conversation
without prior authorization of the Court where a party to the
conversation has consented to the taping.

Since defendant's

counsel had no basis on which to object to such a recording, his
failure to do so cannot be viewed as error nor as prejudicial to
the defendant.

Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel must necessarily fail.
Defendant was properly charged under both the
substantive statute prohibiting the practice of medicine without
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a license and the definitional section specifically describing
what constitutes the practice of medicine; therefore, the trial
court had proper subject matter jurisdiction to try defendant.
The evidence adduced at trial and the reasonable
inferences supported by that evidence are sufficient to sustain
defendant's convictions for promoting a pyramid scheme and
practicing medicine without a license.

Consequently, defendant's

convictions should be affirmed.
Lastly,

defendant's claim that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-

3 (Supp. 1989) prohibiting the operation of a pyramid scheme is
void for vagueness is not properly preserved for appellate
review; therefore, this Court may choose not to reach the merits.
Should the merits of defendant's claim be considered, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6a-3 clearly and unambiguously describes what criminal
conduct is prohibited.

Because an ordinary reader would be

informed of the conduct prohibited, the statute is not void for
vagueness.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL.
It is axiomatic that a defendant is guaranteed the
right to the effective assistance of counsel.

State v. Crestani,

771 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061
(Utah 1989).

To substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, a defendant must show Mboth that his or her counsel
rendered a deficient performance is some demonstrable manner and
that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective

counsel, the result would have been different," State v.
Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1089, quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
118 (1989), State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988).

A

reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome,"

^d. at 1089, citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267
(1984) .
Defendant's sole allegation in support of his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is that his defense counsel
failed to object to the recorded conversation between defendant
and Mrs. Krolls on March 10, 1988.

Defendant asserts that the

recording was in violation of Utah's Interception of
Communications Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-l to -11 (Supp.
1989), because there was not a court order authorizing the
recording.
Defendant correctly asserts that illegal interceptions
may not be entered into evidence, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7
(Supp. 1989).

However, defendant has misconstrued the act as

prohibiting all recordings done without court order, including
consentual recordings and interceptions (Br. of App. at 6-7).
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-4(7) (a) specifically provides:
A person acting under color of law may
intercept a wire, electronic, or oral
communication, where that person is a party
to the communication, or one of the parties
to the communication has given prior consent
to the interception.
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(Empha sis added.)
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have consistently held that there is no violation
of constitutional rights where electronic surveillance is used
with the consent of one of the parties.

United States v.

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 751, 753 (1971) (plurality opinion); reh'q denied,

402

U.S. 990 (1971); State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah
1986); and State v. Boone, 581 P.2d 571, 573-74 (Utah 1978)
(decided under former statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-401(2)
(1973)).
Here, the Utah County Attorney's Office wired Mrs.
Krolls living room with her permission.

Additionally, Mrs.

Krolls was a consenting participant in the recorded conversation.
The recording was never admitted at trial.

Its purpose was

merely to memorialize the conversation to which Mrs. Krolls
eventually testified.

There was no legitimate ground upon which

defendant's attorney could have objected to the recorded
conversation.

As a result, defendant cannot support even the

first prong of his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-4(7)(a) (Supp. 1989) was amended in
1988 and 1989. While the statute was renumbered and reworded,
its substance remained the same. The previous version read:
It shall not be unlawful under this
chapter for a person acting under color of
law to intercept a wire or oral
communication, where that person is a party
to the communication, or one of the parties
to the communication has given prior consent
to the interception.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-4(2)(b) (1982).
-i i -

that his counsel rendered a deficient performance is some
demonstrable manner.

Defendant's claim cannot "overcome the

strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised 'reasonable professional judgment,'"

State v. Frame,

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 669.

Without a showing that counsel's performance was

deficient, there are no grounds to conclude defendant was
prejudiced.

Defendant's claim that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel is without merit.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT HAD PROPER SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION TO TRY DEFENDANT.
Defendant maintains that he was prosecuted only under a
definitional section of the Utah Medical Practice Act and,
therefore, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
(Br. of App. 9-10.) An examination of the record reveals that
defendant's claim is in error.
Defendant correctly states that the information was
amended at trial (T. 2-4). However, he incorrectly asserts he
was charged and convicted solely under the definitional section
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986), rather than both Utah
Code Ann. S§ 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986) and 58-12-30 (Cumm. Supp.
1989) (R. 52). 2

Utah Code Ann. S 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986) was recodified in 1987
and 1989 such that subsection (4)(a) is now subsection (5)(a).
The language is the same. Since defendant and the information in
question refer to subsection (4) (a), respondent will as well.
See S 58-12-28(5)(a) (Cumm. Supp. 1989).

The original information charged defendant with
deceptive business practices in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-507 (Supp. 1989), doing business without a license, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-410 (1978) and practicing
medicine without a licence in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5812-30 as defined by § 58-12-28(3) (4) (R. 54) (Copy attached in
Addendum as Appendix A). The information was subsequently
amended to charge defendant with operating a pyramid scheme in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 and practicing medicine
without a licence in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 and
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(a) (R. 52-53) (Copy attached in
Addendum as Appendix B).
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful to engage in the practice of
medicine in this state without first
obtaining a license. Any person who engages
in the practice of medicine without a license
shall be guilty of a felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(a) provides:
"Practice of medicine" means:
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct,
advise, or prescribe for any human
disease, ailment, injury, infirmity,
deformity, pain or other condition,
physical or mental, real or imaginary, or
to attempt to do so by any means or
instrumentality.
The amended information did nothing more than state
with greater specificity the means by which defendant violated
the criminal statute.

It narrowed the scope of relevant proof

and limited the State's evidence.

Indeed, when defense counsel

objected to the amendment, the trial court ruled the prosecution
would be limited in proving what acts constituted the practice of
medicine to the subsection 4(a) definition (R. 176-77).
-13-

Clearly, the amendment of the information did nothing
to diminish the subject matter jurisdiction of the district
court.

Utah Const, art. VIII, S 5; Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4

(Supp. 1989).

Defendant was properly convicted of a substantive

offense coupled with a definitional statute.
POINT III
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR OPERATING
A PYRAMID SCHEME AND PRACTICING MEDICINE
WITHOUT A LICENSE.
Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence
to sustain his convictions for operating a pyramid scheme, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) and practicing medicine without
a license, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Cumm. Supp. 1989).
Defendant specifically argues with respect to his conviction for
practicing medicine without a license 1) that but for an
illegally recorded conversation improperly admitted into evidence
there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction and 2)
that the evidence is insufficient to show his conduct exceeded an
exception in Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30(5) (Cumm. Supp. 1989),
allowing for domestic or family remedies.

With respect to his

conviction for operating a pyramid scheme, defendant argues that
there was no evidence of illegal conduct.
The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence in a jury trial is well settled.

This Court:

must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and will interfere
only when the evidence is so lacking and
insubstantial that a reasonable person could
not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989), quoting
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983).

Further since a

jury "is in the best position to give proper weight to the
peripheral nature of [any] contradictory testimony", State v.
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1988):
It is not this court's duty to measure
conflicting evidence or the credibility of
witnesses. That responsibility belongs
strictly to the trier of fact. M'It is the
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the
evidence and determine the credibility of the
witnesses.' So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all requisite elements
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the
court's] inquiry stops."
Id. at 27, quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted).

A reversal of the jury verdict is only

warranted when:
the evidence . . . is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime.
State v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989), quoting
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

When the defense

testimony presented merely differs from that of the prosecution
and the prosecution's account of the facts does not appear to be
so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must necessarily have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime charged, a reviewing court is obligated to assume the jury
believed the evidence which supports the jury's verdict.

State

v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah 1981); State v. Smathers, 602
P.2d 708, 709 (Utah 1979).
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A review of the record reveals that there is more than
sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's convictions.
A.

Operating a Pyramid Scheme

Defendant was charged with operating a pyramid scheme
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) which in
pertinent part reads, "A person may not organize, establish,
promote, or administer any pyramid scheme."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

6a-2(4) (Supp. 1989) defines pyramid scheme as
any sales device or plan under which a person
gives consideration to another person in
exchange for compensation or the right to
receive compensation which is derived
primarily from the introduction of other
persons into the sales device or plan rather
than from the sale of goods, services, or
other property.
The jury was properly instructed as to the relevant statutory
definitions of "consideration", "compensation", "person", and
"pyramid scheme" (R. 91).
The evidence established that defendant organized and
sought a business license to operate the Health Wealthy and Wise
Club (HWW) (R. 232, 300-01).

HWW generated income exclusively

from the sale of memberships (R. 232-33).

Membership dues were

$25.00 each month which entitled each member to one gallon of
Super Oxol (R. 234). HWW membership applications contained
information describing the $25 per month dues, pay scales and
commission or bonuses that could be earned by recruiting new
members (R. 227). Commissions were earned solely by inducing new
members to join.

No commission could be earned by selling Super

Oxol, HWW's only product (R. 232-34, 304-06).

Members made

promises to share the sales plan with friends and neighbors (R.
-16-

235).

Commissions were due to be paid by the 15th of each month

(R. 235). Expert testimony was presented that based on these
undisputed facts HWW was structured as a pyramid organization
marketing plan (R. 242-43).
The evidence places defendant's conduct squarely within
the prohibited activities proscribed by statute.

Defendant's

argument that there is was no evidence of illegal conduct is
simply unfounded.
B.

Practicing Medicine Without a License

Count II of the information charged defendant with
practicing medicine without a license in violation of Utah Code
Ann. SS 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986) and 58-12-30 (Cumm. Supp. 1989).
The jury was properly instructed that in order to find defendant
guilty it must find that defendant engaged in the practice of
medicine without first obtaining a license (R. 88). Practice of
medicine was defined, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 58-1228(4)(a) as meaning "to diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or
prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity,
deformity, pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or
imaginary, or to attempt to do so by any means or
instrumentality."

(R. 89, Jury Instruction 4).

The evidence was uncontradicted that defendant had no
medical training nor medical expertise (R. 316). His defense was
that he had not held himself out as a medical expert and his
activities did not constitute the practice of medicine (R. 271,
315).

However, the evidence established that defendant, in

response to an inquiry from Mrs. Krolls about any effect of Super
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Oxol on high blood pressure, responded that it would expand and
clean her blood vessels, give them more elasticity, and make it
easier for blood to flow thereby reducing her blood pressure (R.
220, 224). He told Mr. Krolls that if she drank Super Oxol that
she would be "a lot healthier" (R. 221-2).

He made general

representations that the ingestion of Super Oxol would help most
everything (R. 273). His own testimony was that based on his
review of medical literature, he believed Super Oxol could reduce
all disease by 98 percent including aids, coronary disease and
cancer (R. 283-87, 316-17).
Clearly defendant had "treated, advised or prescribed"
his product, Super Oxol, for Mrs. Krolls' reported high blood
pressure.
Defendant's contention that but for the illegally
recorded conversation between himself and Mrs. Krolls's there
exists insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction is
frivolous.

As discussed previously, (See Point I) the

conversation was legally recorded pursuant to statutory law.
Mrs. Krolls was a proper witness to testify to her conversation
with defendant.

Defendant did not dispute the conversation nor

Mrs. Krolls testimony (R. 271). Further, the tape was never
admitted into evidence.
Defendant's other contention that his conduct did not
exceed the exception proscribed in Utah Code Ann. S 58-12-30(5)
for domestic or family remedies is also without foundation.

The

jury was instructed on defendant's theory (R. 90) but properly
concluded that defendant's activities did not constitute a family

remedy or the sale of vitamins, health food, health food
supplements, herbs or other products of nature.

Commenting on

the exception for domestic or family remedies, the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 147 P. 488, 492
(1915), observed:
the obvious purpose of the statute is to
prevent practicing medicine without a license
. . . . [A]ny one who shall diagnose, treat
or advise for any physical ailment or
condition of another, for a fee, compensation
or consideration is practicing medicine. If
any one does that without a license he
offends, no matter the remedy substance, or
thing he may prescribe, give administer, or
advise.
In accord, State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987).
Defendant did not simply offer gratuitous and innocuous advice to
Mrs. Krolls.

Rather, he purported to have created a mixture that

contained "probably the best kept secret in the world" to wit,
oxygen (R. 280-81).

He claimed, based on his medical readings,

that the internal ingestion of his produce would cure "most
anything" (R. 273, 283-84).

He encouraged Mrs. Krolls to

purchase Super Oxol as a cure or treatment of her high blood
pressure (R. 223-24, 273). As such, his conduct clearly comes
within the parameters of the statute, a statute designed to
protect:
. . . [T]he people from the quacks who would
deceive them into thinking they are receiving
medical relief when, in reality, they are
being deprived of their money without the
remotest possibility of a cure. This type of
quackery also prevents people who may be or
are in dire need of competent aid by either
delaying or foregoing proper treatment.
These ill people think they are being cured,
when, in fact, they are receiving no real
help.
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State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602, 605-06 (Utah 1976).
Based on the totality of the evidence, there is more
than "some evidence" from which the jury could reasonably
conclude that defendant had both operated a pyramid scheme and
practiced medicine without a license.
defendant is compelling.

The evidence against

With the added presumption in favor of

the jury's findings, the evidence is more than sufficient for
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6A-3 (SUPP. 1989) WAS NOT
OBJECTED TO AT TRIAL AND CANNOT BE RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. SHOULD THIS COURT
REACH THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6A-3 (SUPP. 1989) IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
Lastly, defendant asserts that his conviction for
operating a pyramid scheme should be reversed because the
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) is void for
vagueness.
A review of the record reveals that defendant did not
object to the constitutionality of the statute at trial and
raises the issue for the first time on appeal.

Because there was

not a specific objection raised at trial, defendant has failed to
preserve this issue for appellate review.

The Utah Supreme Court

has commented:
'A general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such a
claim on appeal.' Importantly the grounds
for an objection must be specifically and
distinctly stated.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) quoting State
v, Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (1987); State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d
1123 (Utah 1989).

Accordingly, this Court may choose not to

reach the merits of defendant claim.
Alternatively, should this Court consider the merits of
defendant's claim, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) is not
void for vagueness as it applies to defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3, in its entirety, provides:
(1) A person may not organize, establish,
promote, or administer any pyramid scheme.
(2) A criminal conviction under this
chapter is prima facie evidence of a
violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act.
(3) Any violation of this chapter
constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4,
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
(4) All civil violations of this chapter
shall be investigated and prosecuted as
prescribed by the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act.
Defendant argues that the reference to the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act without a delineation of the formal
provisions of § 13-11-4 renders the statute unconstitutionally
void for vagueness.
Challenges to statutes on the grounds of vagueness
essentially involve procedural due process issues, i.e. whether
the statute adequately provides notice of the proscribed conduct.
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987).

A -statute is

not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to
inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited," Jd.
192, quoting State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982).

In

at

accord, State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426, 430-31 (Utah 1987)
citing Lanzetta v. New York, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).

Moreover,

-legislative enactments are accorded a presumption of validity,"
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987).
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-3 is explicit and unambiguous is
its language: "A person may not organize, establish, promote, or
administer any pyramid scheme."

The definition of a pyramid

scheme is provided in the preceding section:
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or
plan under which a person gives consideration
to another person in exchange for
compensation or the right to receive
compensation which is derived primarily from
the introduction of other persons into the
sales device or plan rather than from the
sale of goods, services, or other property.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-2(4).
The prohibited criminal conduct in § 76-6a-3 is clear
and explicit.

The additional language describing civil

consequences of a criminal conviction cannot reasonably be said
to confuse the ordinary reader of what criminal conduct is
prohibited.
Even if the challenged sections were constitutionally
infirm, any detriment to defendant could only arise in the
context of a civil proceeding under § 13-11-4.

The objected to

language has no effect on his criminal conviction.

State v.

Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed.

DATED this

f/h

day of August, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney G
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
E. O'DELL STANLEY
DOB:
9-19-24
Defendant(s)

INFORMATION

-

Criminal No. %*% (

STEVEN B. KILLPACK, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the defendant(s) of the following
crime(s).
COUNT I: DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, a Class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of Section 76-6-507, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
in that he, on or about March 10, 1988, in Utah County, Utah, did,
in the course of business sell, offer or expose for sale adulterated
or mislabeled commodities.
COUNT II: DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Class B Misdemeanor,
in violation of 76-8-410 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
in that he, on or about March 10, 1988, in Utah Countv, Utah, did
commence or carrv on a business which required a license by a
county, city or town ordinance without takincr out the license
required by law.
COUNT III: PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Sections 58-12-28 (3) (4) and 58-12-30 of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he, on or about
March 10, 1988, in Utah County, Utah, did engaae in the practice
of medicine in the State of Utah without first obtaining a license.

This Information is based on evidence sworn to by
Authorized foriirosecution
toriyosecution by

Frank

w<*li,

UCAO

>
COMPLAINANT

UTAfl COUNTY ATTORNEY

DEPUTY
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Utah County Attorney
37 East Center, Suite 200
Provo. Utah 84601

-T. '
C

PROVO

DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH

STUrt OF UTAH.

AMENDED

Plaintiff,

'

INFORMATION

r_

-

at ^i^

vs.
E.

fe t

O'DELL STANLEY
Criminal No.

GO

(•<''('^-. (.<•' f f r ^ ' 7
'/US i/. rr.^C- J.7V.V
/ •

STEVEN B. KILLPACK, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the defendant(s) of the following
crimes):

A-

^'

COUNT^f-t^TJ2ECEPTIVE BUSIN^SS._EBAC?^eE^, a Class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of^S^ti^xi^^^
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
in that he^j2J*-T5Tabc^^
19R8, in Utah County, Utah, did,
in the^efrcfrse of business sell, oTfe^-or^expose for sale adulterated
.slabeled commodities.
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COUNT Jff: PYRAMID SCHEME, a Third Deqree Felony, in violation oT
Section 76-6a-3, Utah Criminal Code, as amended, in that he, on or
about M ar ch 10, 19RR, in Utah County, Utah, did orqanize, establish,
promote or administer a pyramid scheme in violation of the Prvamid
Scheme Pet,
to-wit: Healthy, Wealthv and Wise.
COUNT SHE: PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Third Deqree
Felony, in violation of Sections 58-12-28 (£) {A )(^) and 58-12-30, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he, on or about March 10,
1988, in Utah County, Utah, did engage in the practice of medicine
in the State of Utah without first obtaining a license.
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